on intervention, self-determination, territorial occupation, human rights, sharing of resources and foreign investment. They purport to "declare the law," either in general terms or as applied to a particular case. Neither in form nor in intent are they recommendatory. Surprising as it may seem, the authority of the General Assembly to adopt such declaratory resolutions was accepted from the very beginning. At its first session, in 1946, the Assembly considered the Nuremberg Principles and then "affirmed" them in a unanimous resolution,.6 In another resolution adopted at the same session, genocide was declared a crime under international law.7 This, too, was unanimous. No one questioned the Assembly's competence to adopt such resolutions despite the absence of explicit Charter authority to do so. The Assembly also interpreted and applied the Charter in particular cases, characterizing certain conduct as illegal. The resolutions condemning South Africa for apartheid and for its administration of South West Africa fall into this category.8 The competence of the Assembly to do this -that is, to destigate conduct as illegal under the Charter and to assert obligations and rights applicable in particular cases -was not questioned.
What was, however, in question was the legal force of the declarations of law, whether general or particular. Could they be considered "binding" when the Assembly lacked constitutional authority to adopt mandatory decisions concerning the subjects dealt with? If not binding, were they authoritative in some other sense? Was unanimity or near-unanimity a requirement for their authority? If nearly all states agreed on what is the law, was there a sufficient reason to deny effect to that determination? These and related questions gave rise to official perplexity and a considerable body of legal analysis.9 Some issues were clarified though by no means settled. In fact, the issues have become more controversial as more declaratory resolutions have been adopted and as increasing emphasis has been placed on their authority. Such resolutions have been used to legitimize action by international institutions as well as by states in their international -and sometimes even domestic -affairs. What appeared in the early years to be a noncontroversial means to affirm principles of law seems to have
